DELIVERING FOR NUTRITION IN SOUTH ASIA CONNECTING THE DOTS ACROSS SYSTEMS

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What we do in the paper?

- assess how <u>access & utilization</u> of PDS are <u>differentiated</u> particularly with shocks across groups (<u>gender, social identity, economic status,</u> <u>migration credentials</u>, local social and political power
- Statistical discrimination (Arrow and Phelps, Akerlof 1984); Taste based discrimination (Becker 1957)
- Overt and covert sources of differentiation
- 2 rounds of surveys in poor and migrant donor states of Bihar, Eastern Up (EUP), and Odisha -Information about experiences of accessing PDS pre and post NFSA
- Periodic Labour Force Survey PLFS collected information on migration
 - Migrants overlooked
 - Migration is costly-lower middle-income hump in migration
 - Marriage as reason for migration
- FHH resulting from migration
- Several innovations in PDS-One Nation One Ration Card (ONORC)-switches bargaining power between Fair Price Shops (FPS) agents and leading to willingness to pay for the feature.
- ONORC to address differential access; greatest reform for migrant HHs; 2018, Enables migrant workers and their family members to access PDS benefits from any Fair Price Shop anywhere in the country; portability and divisibility; transparency\, accountability, inbuilt automated accounting system linked to

Migrants, Beneficiary Preferences, and Shocks: Evidence from Largest Social Safety Net in India (PDS)

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
International Food Policy Research Institute


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Use of ONORC:

- a big fraction of migrant households **in Bihar, particularly in intrastate migration** have utilized ONORC provisions.
- The utilization of ONORC is **comparatively low** in other <u>migrant</u> donor states.
- Our survey (conducted in January 2021) shows that most respondents, 57% in Bihar, 62% in EUP, 72% in <u>Odisha were not</u> <u>aware about the ONORC and its provisions</u> in terms of portability and/or divisibility.
- Bihar, a migrant donor state, had most (80%) willing to pay for ONORC services

Conclusion:

- Simple lack of awareness regarding PDS that varies by group identity is an important factor behind differential access
- Varied ways of differentiation, Issue of incentives for PDS dealer unattended
- Use of systems in NFSA interface with local social and power relations
- Effective ONORC may have a significant role in addressing issues of access
- Innovations like ONORC that can address the PDS needs of millions of migrants but most importantly realign the bargaining power distribution between the dealer and the beneficiary.
- Finally, in terms of some <u>due refinements like ONORC, again we find</u> a need for greater information dissemination.
- Contingent on understanding how ONORC works, there is willingness to pay for it in regions with large migrant populations.



CONNECTING THE DOTS ACROSS SYSTEMS

Importance of ONORC- Ordered logit regression results

	Very Important		Important		Not important	
	dydx	SE	dydx	SE	dydx	SE
Female Headed Household	-0.011	(0.041)	0.007	(0.041)	0.004	(0.020)
(1=Female and 0=Male)	-0.011	(0.061)	0.007	(0.041)	0.004	(0.020)
Social Caste: OBCs (Base-SC&ST)	-0.052	(0.042)	0.035	(0.029)	0.017	(0.013)
Social Caste: General (Base-SC&ST)	0.016	(0.051)	-0.011	(0.036)	-0.005	(0.015)
Migrated HHs (atleast one member migrated)	-0.122*	(0.068)	0.082*	(0.045)	0.040*	(0.024)
Economic Status: Middle (Base-Poor)	-0.046*	(0.024)	0.030*	(0.016)	0.015*	(0.008)
Economic Status: Rich (Base-Poor)	-0.003	(0.025)	0.002	(0.017)	0.001	(0.008)
Economic Power						
(1=High Income Generating;	0.058*	(0.031)	-0.039*	(0.020)	-0.019*	(0.011)
0 = Low Income Generating)						
Dependency Ratio (nos)	0.000	(0.001)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)
Usage Index	0.034	(0.069)	-0.023	(0.046)	-0.011	(0.023)
(0 to 1)	0.054	(0.007)	0.025	(0.0+0)	0.011	(0.023)
Awareness Index	0.216***	(0.051)	-0.145***	(0.037)	-0.071***	(0.016)
(0 to 1)	0.210	(0.031)	-0.1-5	(0.037)	-0.071	(0.010)
Entitlement Index	-0.130**	(0.058)	0.087**	(0.038)	0.043**	(0.020)
(0 to 1)	-0.130	(0.030)	0.007	(0.050)	0.043	(0.020)
Quality of Services	0.062	(0.086)	-0.042	(0.058)	-0.020	(0.027)
(0 to 1)	0.002	(0.000)	-0.0-12	(0.050)	-0.020	(0.027)
Interaction	-0.002	(0.039)	0.001	(0.026)	0.001	(0.013)
(Female Headed * Economic Power)	-0.002	(0.037)	0.001	(0.020)	0.001	(0.013)
Interaction	0.112**	(0.049)	-0.075**	(0.033)	-0.037**	(0.017)
(Female Headed * Migration)	0.112	(0.047)	0.073	(0.000)	0.007	(0.017)
Interaction	-0.101	(0.067)	0.068	(0.045)	0.033	(0.023)
(Female Headed * Social Caste - OBC - (Base-SC&ST))	-0.101	(0.007)	0.000	(0.0+3)	0.000	(0.023)
Interaction	-0.147**	(0.072)	0.099**	(0.047)	0.048*	(0.025)
(Female Headed * Social Caste - General - (Base-SC&ST))	U.17/	(0.072)		(0.077)	0.070	(0.020)
Interaction	0.149**	(0.058)	-0.100***	(0.038)	-0.049**	(0.021)
(Migration * Social Caste - OBC - (Base-SC&ST))	V. 177	(0.030)	-0.100	(0.030)	-0.04/	(0.021)
Interaction	0.128	(0.079)	-0.086	(0.053)	-0.042	(0.027)
(Migration * Social Caste - General- (Base-SC&ST))	0.120	(0.077)	-0.000	(0.055)	-0.042	(0.027)